This paper provides a set of stylized facts on the mechanisms through which banking and sovereign distress feed into each other, using a large sample of emerging economies over three decades. We first define "twin crises" as events where banking crises and sovereign defaults combine, and further distinguish between those banking crises that end up in sovereign debt crises, and vice-versa. We then assess what differentiates "single" episodes from "twin" ones. Using an event analysis methodology, we study the behavior around crises of variables describing the balance sheet interconnection between the banking and public sectors, the characteristics of the banking sector, the state of public finances, and the macroeconomic context. We find that there are systematic differences between "single" and "twin" crises across all these dimensions. Additionally, we find that "twin" crises are heterogeneous events: taking into account the proper time sequence of crises that compose "twin" episodes is important for understanding their drivers, transmission channels and economic consequences. Our results shed light on the mechanisms surrounding feedback loops of sovereign and banking stress.
Introduction
Due to the expansion of balance sheets, falling capital ratios and product innovation, risks in the banking systems across the world have risen steadily in the last decades, leading to an increase in the frequency and scale of public interventions after financial crises (Alessandri and Haldane, 2009) . In turn, these interventions have strained governments and, at times, threatened the sustainability of public debt (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011) . Still, there is evidence that the transmission of distress has often gone in the opposite direction, with situations of acute fiscal stress triggering systemic banking crises (Caprio and Honohan, 2008) .
The two-way interaction between the banking and public sectors has attracted increased attention lately, as the recent crisis has engulfed a number of advanced economies into a perverse feedback loop of fiscal and financial distress. On the one hand, a number of countries faced severe banking crises, which triggered fiscal troubles due to the magnitude of bank rescue operations. Arguably, this is what happened to Iceland and Ireland, where the materialization of contingent claims in the form of deposit guarantees brought havoc to the sovereign's balance sheet 4 . On the other hand, pro-cyclical fiscal policy and a lack of competitiveness, among other factors, led to a sovereign debt crisis in Greece in early 2010. As foreign investors withdrew, banks became major holders of public debt. Successive sovereign downgrades, ending in a private sector involvement operation, contributed to the collapse of the Greek banking sector.
While these recent developments have sparked a growing interest in the nature of feedback loops between the sovereign and the banking sector in the euro area 5 , intertwined fiscal and financial crises are nothing new, as emerging economies know too well. Ecuador (in the mid-nineties) and Dominican Republic (in the early 2000s) accumulated so much debt trying to sort out a sequence of bank troubles that were forced to restructure their sovereign debt obligations. In turn, during the Argentinean (2001) and Russian (1998) crises, governments relied heavily on domestic banks as a source of financing. The eventual sovereign defaults imposed large losses on the heavily exposed banks, ultimately triggering banking crises 6 .
Against this background, it is surprising that the large literature looking at how different types of crises occur and combine (the so-called "twin crises" literature) has only recently begun to examine the links between fiscal and financial distress.
Moreover, most papers focus on either one or the other direction of transmission, and only a few papers address the two-way nature of the relationship. Concerning emerging economies, there are two notable exceptions: Panizza and Borenzstein (2008) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) . Panizza and Borenzstein (2008) find that the probability of a banking crisis conditional on a default is much higher than the unconditional probability of a banking crisis, while the probability of a default conditional on a banking crisis is just slightly higher than the unconditional one. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) analyze the cycles underlying serial debt and banking crises using long time-series on public and external debt, and obtain exactly the opposite result: it is banking crises that turn out to be significant predictors of sovereign debt crises, and not the other way around 7 . One drawback of these studies is that, while they nicely discuss the channels of transmission between sovereign and bank distress, they do not study these channels formally.
A similar criticism applies to the growing literature focusing on the existence of feedback loops between sovereign and financial risks in the euro-area. These recent contributions study the two-way relationship between fiscal and financial tensions by modelling the common dynamics of banks' and sovereigns' Credit Default Swaps 8 .
While the various time series methodologies used in these studies present interesting ways to measure the extent to which sovereign stress drives bank stress and vice-versa, they do not incorporate any macroeconomic and financial variables and, thus, fail to explain the potential drivers and transmitters of this feedback relation.
This paper aims to address this gap by studying the behavior of a larger set of macro-financial variables through which the transmission between fiscal and financial stress may materialize. We are particularly interested in variables describing the balance sheet interconnection between the banking and public sectors, as well as the characteristics of the banking sector, the state of public finances, and the overall economy.
New to the literature, we isolate the following types of events: (i) "single" banking crises i.e. banking crises that are not followed by sovereign defaults; (ii) "single" sovereign debt crises i.e. sovereign defaults not followed by banking crises; (iii) "twin bank-debt" crises, which start with a banking crisis, followed by a sovereign one;
and (iv) "twin debt-bank" crises, where a sovereign crisis is followed by a banking one. We use a large sample of emerging countries over three decades and an event analysis methodology as in Broner et al. (2013) and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) to study the behavior of our variables during a seven-year time window around each type of crises. We are interested in what differentiates "single" banking crises from those that bring down the sovereign and, similarly, what differentiates "single" sovereign defaults from those that eventually lead to banking crises.
Our contribution is two-fold. First, we find that there are systematic differences between "single" crises and "twin" ones. By distinguishing between "single" and "twin" events, we find that a number of empirical facts usually associated with either "banking" or "debt" crises in general are to be found in "twin" events only, and not in "single" episodes. Second, we show that considering the sequence of crisis within "twin" events, that is, taking into account whether the trigger of a "twin" crisis is a debt crisis or a banking one, is important for understanding their transmission channels and the economic consequences of policies deployed to solve them.
Regarding the differences between "single" banking and "twin bank-debt" events, our results can be summarized as follows. The interplay between banks' and both Central Bank's and government's balance sheets differs significantly in terms of levels and dynamics, pointing to a combination of differences in the size and timing of initial shocks, banking sector characteristics, and policy strategies used to deal with banking sector problems. On average, banking systems are significantly larger and deeper around banking crises that are part of "twin" events. In "single" episodes, banks start sizing down ahead of the crisis and continue to do so as the crisis unfolds. In contrast, in "twin" episodes, not only does asset downsizing start late into the banking crisis, but also the process is more gradual. This might indicate that the policy response is to try to keep the banking sector afloat, postponing deleveraging until the crisis engulfs the public sector as well.
While the two events occur against similar initial debt and budget positions, diverging patterns of public finances emerge once banking crises are underway.
Banking crises that are part of "twin" bank-debt events are associated with a sharper increase in budget deficit, on the account of a shoot-up in public spending, as well as with a larger accumulation of public debt, which suggests that they put more strains on government finances than "single" banking events. Finally, banking crises that are part of "twin" episodes have a more damaging and persistent effect on the economy in terms of growth and inflation. These events are also associated with a larger loss in foreign investors' confidence, as reflected in a sudden stop of portfolio inflows and a sharp change in the composition of foreign debt towards short-term liabilities.
Regarding the differences between "single" debt and "twin debt-bank" crises, we find that, ahead of the latter, the average banking sector is more exposed to the government and the pace of increase in its public debt holdings is faster. The amount of liquidity support provided by the central bank around the two episodes is significantly larger than in non-crisis times, suggesting that banking sector tensions accompany both events, including "single" ones. Nevertheless, while the liquidity support is flat throughout "single" crises, it increases dramatically during "twin" ones.
These large differences in the levels and dynamics of central bank support and banks' exposure to the sovereign could indicate that, on the one hand, "twin" defaults are more damaging to banks' balance sheets, and, on the other hand, they leave the sovereign with less margin to support the banking sector.
While the state of public finances is roughly similar ahead of the two events, public expenditure is cut more drastically (and public debt drops faster) in the aftermath of "twin" defaults. This could point to either a lack of fiscal space, or the adoption of a more austere stabilization package, both of which may negatively affect the banking sector and the economy in the short run. Defaults associated with "twin" events have a larger immediate negative impact on growth, while the recovery in the aftermath is slower. These growth dynamics are accompanied by inflation rates that fall more markedly during "twin" events than during "single" ones. Finally, "twin" defaults are accompanied by sharp drops in portfolio capital inflows and a shift in the composition of foreign borrowing towards shorter maturities, reflecting the large loss of credibility suffered by the sovereign.
Apart from the systematic differences between "single" and "twin" crises, our analysis also shows that "twin" crises themselves are far from being homogenous events. By taking into account the different sequence of crises during "twin" episodes, we are able to uncover contrasting dynamics, such as those of budget deficits, budget expense, inflation and portfolio capital flows, which would have otherwise gone unnoticed. We thus provide a more refined characterization of the environment around "twin" crises.
Our results add to a literature aimed at uncovering stylized facts associated with financial and economic crises. We believe that these results, by providing a detailed understanding of the economic dynamics around different crisis episodes, can help in building better early warning indicators, as well as in designing theoretical models where these issues can be studied more formally.
The event study presented in this paper is useful in terms of uncovering important stylized facts, particularly in revealing nonlinear relationships. Still, this methodology is not suitable for examining causality and, moreover, cannot discriminate among the various mechanisms at work behind the dynamics of individual variables.
Addressing these issues requires a structural model, which is the next step on our research agenda.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section provides a discussion of the main feedback channels between bank and sovereign distress, as identified so far in the literature. Section 3 introduces the definitions of crises, as well as the data and methodology, while section 4 discusses the main results of this paper. Section 5 concludes.
How does distress transmit? An overview of the literature
In order to guide our choice of variables, we briefly discuss the main channels through which financial tensions may lead to sovereign stress, and vice-versa. These channels include direct balance sheet interconnections, through public rescue operations and banks' holdings of public debt, as well as other indirect ways through which underlying vulnerabilities in either the banking or public sector may materialize into twin crises.
As argued above, few papers have focused on the two directions of transmission between fiscal and financial stress in emerging countries. More evidence is recently being provided on the feedback loops between banks and sovereigns in the euroarea. According to Moody's (2014) , the euro-area did not suffer one financial crisis, but a variety of crises, each of them with its own specificities. Accordingly, only
Ireland witnessed a spill over of financial stress into sovereign stress. Instead, the opposite occurred in Greece and Italy, where sovereign stress lead to financial crises. For the rest of the countries analysed, the article finds evidence of a two-way relationship, with stress feeding back in both directions, as also documented by Alter and Beyer (2013) .
Channels through which banking crises may affect the sovereign
Banking crises may put strains on governments through both direct and indirect channels. The former refers to the fiscal costs that the sovereign incurs when attempting to bail out the banking sector, or when explicit guarantees and contingent liabilities materialize. The latter goes through the impact of banking crises, and of policies deployed to address them, on the economy and market sentiment.
In their study on the link between banking and debt crises across history, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) put forward four stylized facts. First, banking crises, both homegrown and imported, usually accompany or lead (predict) sovereign debt crises.
Second, external (private and public) debt surges ahead of banking crises. Third, public borrowing increases sharply ahead of sovereign debt crises, and, moreover, it turns out that the government has additional "hidden debts" (domestic public debt and contingent private debt)
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. Fourth, the composition of debt shifts towards the short-term before both debt and banking crises.
According to Candelon and Palm (2010) , there are four main channels of transmission from banking crises to the sovereign. First, rescue operations may impair the sustainability of public finances 10 . These operations can include bailout money, liquidity provisioning by the central bank, public recapitalization and the execution or materialization of public guarantees. 11 Second, if contingent liabilities materialize, fiscal costs are likely to be substantial. Next, the risk premium increases even if guarantees are not exercised, raising borrowing costs for both the sovereign and the private sector ("sovereign ceiling") 12 . Last, the economic downturn typically accompanying financial crises increases the deficit and drives up public debt.
In the same vein, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) provide evidence of a strong negative impact of financial turmoil on asset prices, employment and output. The deterioration of the fiscal position after a banking crisis is likely to occur due to a combination of lower revenues and higher expenditures (assistance to troubled 9 In fact, keeping domestic debt in the picture explains why governments default at low external debt levels, or resort to inflation to reduce the debt burden The direct fiscal costs of banking crises are well documented -see Feenstra and Taylor (2012) , Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) or Arellano and Kocherlakota (2012) . 12 Laeven and Valencia (2012) show that blanket guarantees increase the fiscal costs of banking crises, but this can also be due to the fact that they are set in place during big crises.
banks and outlays associated with the economic downturn). Indeed, the paper argues that that the critical factor behind fiscal distress is not the cost of bank rescue operations, but rather the collapse in tax revenues in the wake of the deep contractions associated with financial crises. These effects are specific to each episode, but estimated fiscal costs of the median systemic banking crisis stand at 15.5% of GDP, while public debt increases by around 30% of GDP during these episodes. (Honohan, 2008) . Moreover, according to Baldacci and Gupta (2009) Additionally, banking crises may ignite a currency crash that makes public authorities unable to repay foreign currency debt (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011, De Paoli et al., 2009 
Channels through which sovereign distress may affect banks
When considering the transmission channels of a fiscal crisis to the broader economy, a number of these can be traced through the domestic financial system.
Whenever assets need to be written off, rescheduled, or simply marked-to-market, banks are usually the first in line to take a hit. Noyer (2010) , among others, argue that banks' holdings of defaulted government bonds might lead to large capital losses and thus threaten the solvency of different elements of the banking sector. In addition, authorities often react to debt problems by coercing domestic creditors to hold government bonds (frequently in non-market terms), aggravating the situation in the event of a default (Díaz-Cassou et al., 2008) . For instance, prior to the 2001 crisis, half of Argentina's bank assets were public sector liabilities. In Russia, the severe sovereign debt crisis had a much weaker effect on overall wealth and activity than what would have been typically expected because financial intermediation was so low 17 . Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) show that defaults often go hand in hand with inflation, currency devaluations and crashes, and banking crises 18 16 Moreover, they find that periods of high international capital mobility gave rise to banking crises in the past. The probability of a banking crisis conditional on a capital flow bonanza is higher than the unconditional probability in 61% of the countries they cover (for the period 1960-2007).
. IMF (2002) provides a comprehensive overview of the effects of four sovereign restructurings (Ecuador, Pakistan, Russia and Ukraine) on the domestic banking sector. Apart from the direct losses associated with banks' holdings of government securities, the paper also documents an increase in the interest rates on liabilities (due to the higher risk not being matched by increased returns on assets -on the contrary, in this context government securities usually offer non-market rates), as well as an increase in the rate of nonperforming loans (as higher financing costs lead to corporate bankruptcies).
A few theoretical papers have highlighted the channels through which sovereign distress may translate into financial distress. Acharya et al. (2014) and financial risk is due to the fact that banks invest in government securities in order to hedge against future liquidity shocks. Along these lines, Angeloni and Wolff (2012) empirically assess the impact of sovereign bond holdings on the performance of banks during the euro-area crisis, using individual bank data and sovereign bond holdings.
Beyond this direct balance sheet effect, the ensuing fiscal contraction may lead to reduced economic activity affecting banks' profits and further damaging the financial system. Moreover, the economic downturn may be reinforced by a credit crunch, as banks reduce lending due to capital losses and the increase in uncertainty that comes with a sovereign default (Panizza and Borenzstein, 2008) . Popov and Van Horen (2013) assess the extent to which increased holdings of distressed sovereign bonds limit banks' ability to extend loans to the private sector, thus amplifying the vicious feedback loop between banks and sovereign by limiting the growth potential of the economy. They document a stronger reallocation away from domestic lending in the euro-area periphery during the recent crisis. A similar crowding out effect is documented in Broner et al. (2014) , who present a battery of stylized facts on the euro-area crisis, including an increase in sovereign bond holdings by banks and a simultaneous drop in financing to the private sector 21 . Moreover, corporate borrowers and banks may face a sudden stop in financing after a sovereign default, even if they are not overexposed to government bonds. Gennaioli et al. (2014) and Das et al. (2011) empirically show that sovereign defaults curtail access to foreign capital for both public and private agents.
Still, an additional pressure on banks to reduce lending might come from the fact that the increased uncertainty following a sovereign default may lead to a run on banks' deposits or a collapse of the interbank market (Panizza and Borenzstein, 2008) . Also, the banking system is not able to operate normally if the government imposes deposit freezes. Finally, sovereign ratings downgrades further limit banks' access to foreign financing, leading to sudden stops or higher borrowing costs (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011) .
Data and methodology
Our initial sample contains 117 emerging and developing countries, covering three decades, from 1975 to 2007. We exclude from our analysis all banking and sovereign episodes linked to the recent global crisis.
Definition and incidence of events
To identify and date sovereign debt crises we rely on the information provided by
Standard & Poor´s (S&P). S&P defines sovereign defaults as situations where: (i) the government does not meet scheduled debt service on the due date or (ii) creditors are offered either a rescheduling (bank debt) or a debt exchange (bond debt) in less favorable terms than the original issue 22 21 While these papers present a more nuanced view of domestic purchases of sovereign bonds, other papers have found positive feedback effects of these purchases. For instance, according to Andritzky (2012) , domestic bank purchases of sovereign bonds limit the increase in the spreads, helping stabilize sovereign's funding needs.
. With regard to banking crises, we use the 22 While there are situations in which defaults may either take the form of high inflation episodes or be averted through an IMF intervention, we take a stricter view and focus on explicit defaults only.
so-called "systemic" events identified by Laeven and Valencia (2013a) Given that ending dates of both sovereign and banking crises are hard to establish, we mark the first year of each crisis only. Crises of the same type that occur at less than three years of distance are considered single events. Finally, we define "twin crises" as pairs of sovereign debt and banking crises that take place at intervals of less than three years one from the other.
Accordingly, we isolate the following types of events: (i) "single" banking crises i.e.
banking crises that are not followed by sovereign distress; (ii) "single" sovereign debt crises i.e. sovereign defaults that are nor followed by banking crises; (iii) "twin bankdebt" crises, that start with a banking crisis, followed by a sovereign one during the following three years; and (iv) "twin debt-bank" crises, where a sovereign crisis is followed by a banking one during the following three years.
Using these definitions we obtain 121 sovereign debt crises and 113 banking crises.
Of these, 36 are twin events -that is, around 30% of either banking or debt crises compound into twin ones. Further distinguishing twin crises according to the sequence of events, we find that 17 are twin bank-debt crises and 19 are twin debtbank. Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 1 list these twin episodes, while Table 3 offers an overview of the crises in our sample. Single episodes account for the bulk of our crises: there are 77 single banking crises and 87 single sovereign defaults. All countries in our sample experienced at least one crisis of some kind. About half experienced only one crisis, whereas one third experienced two crises; four countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela and Nigeria) experienced four crises each. A quarter of countries went through at least one twin event. heavily bunched in the 1990s, when almost 60% of the banking crises in the sample took place. Sovereign episodes are slightly more smoothly distributed than banking crises, with a peak in 1980s, when about half of them took place. Crises were more likely to combine into twin events during the 80s and 90s, a feature resurfacing nowadays. About 30% of the sovereign crises and more than half of the banking crises occurring during the 1980s compounded into twin events. In the following decade, 40% of the sovereign defaults, but only 18% of the banking crises, were part of twin events.
For the purpose of our econometric analysis, and due to significant data gaps, we exclude from the sample all low-income countries (39, mostly African, economies), which leaves us with 78 emerging market countries (and 140 distinct crises, of which 51 single banking crises, 61 single crises, 15 twin bank-debt crises and 13 twin debt-bank crises).
Variables: definitions and sources
In light of the discussion in section 2 on the direct and indirect channels of transmission between banking and sovereign distress, we are particularly interested in studying the behavior around crises of four categories of variables, describing: the bank-public balance sheet interconnections; the characteristics of the banking sector; the state of public finances; and the overall economy. Table 4 in Appendix 1
lists all variables used in the analysis, together with their definitions and sources.
To uncover the balance sheet interrelations between the public and banking sectors of the economy, we use the aggregate balance sheet of domestic depository institutions, as reported in the IMF's International Financial Statistics (Table 5 ) 23 . Table 5 shows how the balance sheet interconnection between the banking system and the Central Bank can be decomposed in two parts. On the asset side of the balance sheet we find: (i) reserves (including domestic currency holdings and deposits with the Central Bank); and (ii) claims on monetary authorities, which comprise securities and claims other than reserves). On the liability side, we find the credit provided by monetary authorities to the banking system 24 . This last entry is likely to reflect much of the financial aid that banks get from the Central Bank during turbulent times.
In turn, the balance sheet connections between the banking system and general government are given by the following series. On the asset side, we find banks' holdings of claims on Central Government, State and Local Governments, and nonfinancial public enterprises. On the liability side, we find Central Government's deposits 25 . For our purposes, banking system's exposure to government is computed as the sum of bank claims on the Central, State and Local governments. 
Methodology
Following the work of Broner et al. (2013) and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), we implement an event analysis methodology, which allows us to estimate how the conditional expectation of each variable depends on the temporal distance from each type of crises, given the proximity of other crises, and relative to a "tranquil times" baseline. Consider a variable of interest Z it, where subscripts i and t refer to the country and the period respectively. Our panel specification looks as follows:
In the equation above, Dei(t+p) denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 when country i is p periods away from a crisis of type e in period t. The index e denotes, respectively, debt crises (D), systemic banking crises (B), twin debt-bank crises (DB) and twin bank-debt crises (BD). The event window around crisis episodes is set to seven years -three years before and three years after the crisis. The regression allows for country fixed effects, αi and, in some specifications, for country-specific trends. The error term eit captures all the remaining variation.
Our sample is highly heterogeneous. In order to minimize the effect of heterogeneity, and that of the most extreme observations, we normalize our variables by dividing each series by country-specific standard deviations.
The coefficients βep measure the conditional effect of a crisis of type e on variable Z over the event window, relative to "tranquil times". The fact that the "tranquil times"
baseline is common to all events makes the comparison among coefficients 
Banking crises and sovereign defaults: exploring the links
In this section, we provide a set of stylized facts on the behavior of key economic variables around each of the four types of crises defined in the previous section. In Appendix 2, we plot (a transformation of) the coefficients obtained for each variable and contrast the behavior of our variables around the different types of crisis events 27 . First, we look at the dynamics around banking crises, distinguishing between "single" ones (B) and those that degenerate into sovereign debt crises (BD). We then repeat the analysis for our set of debt crises, distinguishing between "single" debt crises (D) and those that compound into twin debt-bank ones (DB).
In addition to the differences between single and twin events, the analysis presented below reveals that, when contrasting the behavior of variables around twin debtbank and twin bank-debt events, some dynamics are not shared by both types of twin events. This is a very relevant result, as most papers in the literature have not distinguished between twin events according to the original shock (the original crisis). Our findings show that, when taking into account the different sequence of crises during twin episodes, there are remarkable differences in behavior of the budget deficit, budget expense, inflation rate and capital flows 28 .
Banking crises versus twin bank-debt crises
Balance sheet relations These different patterns could be due to differences in the size and timing of the initial shock to the banking sector, policy choices by the central bank and government, structural features of the banking sector or, most likely, a combination of all these factors. Indeed, it is difficult to say whether the large amount of central bank support provided ahead of B, but not ahead of BD, is due to differences in the shocks hitting the banking sector (i.e. high and persistent tensions and a gradual deterioration of the banking sector in B versus a sudden, unexpected, shock to an otherwise healthy system in BD), the size and complexity of the banking sector, strategies chosen to deal with banking sector tensions (i.e. support given through other channels, or mere mismanagement of banking problems, in BD). Similarly, our
analysis cannot discern what is behind the markedly diverging dynamics in the aftermath of the two banking crises. These could be due to differences in the severity of the banking crisis (i.e. tensions in the banking system recede after B, but remain high after the banking crisis in BD and ahead of the ensuing default); resolution strategies focused on bank restructuring, instead on continuing to extend official credit to keep the system afloat; or the size of the fiscal space available (i.e.
the "late" response from the central bank in BD crises could due to the government running out of resources in its initial attempt to sustain the banking sector and the central bank stepping in as the sovereign goes into default).
Additional information into the differences between the two types of banking crises could be obtained from the dataset used in Laeven and Valencia's (2013a) study on the fiscal costs of banking crises. We map our definition of crises into their dataset and obtain several static indicators describing the severity of banking crises, as shown in Table 6 of Appendix 1. According to this table, the difference between B
and BD episodes is not that much in the intensity of the banking crises, as non- While banks' exposure to the government is actually significantly lower than in "tranquil" times ahead of both events, it does increase significantly during both crises windows. The main difference nevertheless lies in the pattern of these increases. Banks' holdings of public debt increase both before and after the banking crisis in BD (particularly accelerating ahead of T), while in B the increase occurs entirely in the aftermath. Thus, what differentiates BD from B is the fast accumulation of public debt holdings ahead of the banking crisis in the former event.
In BD events, the fast accumulation both ahead and after the banking crisis could be due to either failed attempts by the government to strengthen the banking sector, or to banks buying government bonds because incentivized or forced to sustain the government, or both. In contrast, in B events, no significant government bond buying by banks takes place before the crisis, whereas the significant postcrisis accumulation could be the result of either a recapitalization program (and thus the bank resolution strategies switch from liquidity provisioning to balance sheet repair), or, simply, lending decisions by banks, which prefer to retrench from the private sector and instead invest in safer assets.
To sum, the interplay between banks' and both central bank's and government's balance sheets reveals that there are systematic differences around the two episodes, which could reflect different pre-and post-crisis strategies to deal with banking sector problems, together with different banking sector characteristics and different initial shocks. 
The banking sector
We next study whether there are any systematic differences in the banking sectors characteristics around the two crisis episodes. We start by looking at size, measured by the ratio of assets to GDP (Figure 6 ). Several features stand out.
Firstly, on average, banking sectors around BD episodes are larger than those around B episodes. The difference between the two narrows just ahead of the banking crisis, but widens again in the aftermath, due to the opposite dynamics discussed below.
Secondly, there is a substantial build-up in assets ahead of both episodes, but the increase ahead of B events is significantly steeper than the one ahead of BD crises.
Thirdly, in B events, asset downsizing starts the year of the crisis, continues through the following years and is as large as the preceding build-up, such that the banking sector returns to its pre-crisis size rather quickly. In contrast, in BD events, not only does asset downsizing start two years after the banking crisis, but also the process is more gradual than in B. Even at T+3, and as the sovereign defaults, the size of the BD banking sector is larger than both pre-crisis levels and "tranquil" times -BD is in fact the only type of crisis in which assets do not return to pre-crisis levels, but instead remain significantly above "tranquil" levels. This could indicate that the policy response to the unfolding crisis is to try to keep the banking sector afloat, postponing deleveraging until the crisis has already engulfed the public sector as well. Figure 7 shows the evolution of credit extended to the private sector (as a share of GDP), which confirms that banking sectors in BD events are, on average, deeper than those around B crises. While credit expands ahead of both events, the increase is more pronounced ahead of B crises. In turn, the post-crisis fall in credit is similar in both crises.
The evolution of bank deposits to GDP is depicted in Figure 8 . In both events, a significant pre-crisis expansion is followed by a deposit run. Nevertheless, the increase is faster ahead of B, and the subsequent run is larger and occurs earlier in B. While in B, the run leads to post-crisis levels of deposits well below "tranquil" times, in BD, levels are larger than "tranquil" times both ahead and after the banking crisis.
Overall, our results show that banking systems around BD events are significantly larger and deeper than around B events, which suggests that the former potentially need larger government support in situations of stress. Larger and deeper banking sector have a more damaging effect on the economy, giving the government more incentives to intervene and prop up the banking sector (Gennaioli et al, 2014) .
Public finances
Figures 9 to 11 depict the behavior of budget balances, together with those of budget expense and revenues. Budget balance positions are similar ahead of the two events and both worsening throughout the crisis window, such that post-crisis levels are significantly lower than in "tranquil" times. In B, the worsening is gradual and most of it occurs pre-crisis, driven mainly by decreasing budget revenues, as public spending stays flat. In BD, while pre-crisis dynamics are similar to B, there is a sharp deterioration in the immediate aftermath of the banking crisis, due to a large increase in public spending.
The dynamics of public debt, shown in figure 12 , are even more diverging. The sharp increase in BD from T-1 onwards stands out. Indeed, public debt accumulates mainly as the banking crisis gets underway, such that, going into the sovereign default, the level of public debt is much larger than in "tranquil" times. In contrast, government debt remains flat throughout the crisis window in B crises.
Thus, the banking crises in the two events occur against similar pre-crisis budget positions and dynamics, while public debt is actually lower ahead of BD than ahead of B crises. Once banking crises are underway however, diverging patterns of public finances emerge. While the worsening in budget balance moderates in B, there is a sharp increase in budget deficit in BD, on the account of shoot up in public spending after the banking crisis. The difference is even more apparent in terms of public debt, where flat dynamics ahead and after B contrast with the large accumulation in BD, which starts during the year of the banking crisis and continues unabated up to the sovereign default. This could suggests that banking crises put more strains on government finances in BD events, whereas any support for the banking sector that is offered in B episodes is not significantly reflected in either government debt or deficit.
Domestic economy and the external sector
As detailed in the discussion of section 2, banking crises could potentially affect the sovereign indirectly, through the effect they have on the economy and investors' sentiment. Figure 13 depicts the evolution of the real growth rate around the two events. Real growth is significantly below "tranquil" levels ahead of B and worsens immediately after the crisis. Nevertheless, the recovery is rather swift, as growth significantly exceeds pre-crisis rates already by T+2. In contrast, growth collapses at time T and remains significantly lower than "tranquil" times in the aftermath of the BD banking crisis. This suggests that the banking crises that are part of BD events are more disruptive for the economy than single events. This growth pattern is accompanied by a large jump in inflation in the aftermath of the banking crises in BD (see Figure   14 ). This might reflect the authorities' attempts to monetize the debt, or simply a run on the local currency, as the confidence in the sovereign is lost. In fact, inflation rates remain significantly above "tranquil" levels in the aftermath of the BD banking crises. In contrast, while inflation is slightly higher than in "tranquil" times ahead of B, it gradually moderates throughout the crisis window, reaching levels that are similar to "tranquil" ones immediately after the crisis.
One widely documented source of instability for the emerging economies relates to the behavior of international portfolio capital flows, which could potentially be disrupted by banking crises. Figure 15 shows that there is a gradual and similar increase in portfolio capital inflows ahead of both events, which leads to levels that are significantly above "tranquil" times ahead of both crises. In the aftermath of banking crises, the soft landing in B contrasts with the sudden stop in BD.
Figure 16 looks at the share of short-term debt in total foreign debt. While Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) point out that short-term debt tends to increase dramatically ahead of crises, we see that this is the case with BD crises only. While there is a significant shift towards short-term debt ahead of both events, the pace and magnitudes are markedly different. In B, the shift towards shorter maturities is small and gradual, and is followed by an equally gradual reversal to pre-crisis levels. In contrast, there is a large accumulation of short-term debt ahead of BD, reaching levels significantly above "tranquil" ones in the run-up to the banking crisis, reflecting foreign creditors' higher unwillingness to lend in BD relative to B. The behavior of both portfolio capital flows and short-term foreign debt thus seem to suggest that BD banking crises result in larger losses of credibility among foreign investors than B crises, with consequences for the sovereign as well.
Overall, we find that that the macroeconomic environment ahead of B crises is characterized by low growth and high inflation, but that, nevertheless, the economy rebounds already by the second year after the banking crisis. In contrast, growth collapses and inflation shoots up following the BD banking crises. Growth rates then remain depressed, and inflation rates persistently high, suggesting that BD banking crises are more damaging to the economy. These crises are also associated with a larger loss in foreign investors' confidence, as reflected in the behavior of portfolio inflows and short-term foreign debt dynamics.
Sovereign debt crises versus twin debt-bank crises

Balance sheet relations
Figures 17 and 18 show that there is a sharp contrast between D and DB crises in terms of support provided by the central bank to the domestic banking system.
While pre-crisis levels are of similar magnitude and both significantly above "tranquil" levels, what differentiates D and DB events are the dynamics of this indicator and its post-crisis levels. Liquidity support is flat throughout D events, whereas it increases dramatically in DB, especially accelerating during T-1 to T+1. In the aftermath of DB defaults, liquidity support remains persistently well above pre-crisis levels (and "tranquil" levels).
The fact that the amount of central bank support provided around the two defaults is significantly larger than non-crisis levels is an indication that banking sector tensions accompany both defaults, including single events. Presumably, difficulties to obtain financing in wholesale markets (due to increased uncertainty and a loss of investor confidence) and a deteriorating environment put strains on banking sectors around both episodes. Nevertheless, the significant differences in dynamics and post-crisis levels between the two events could indicate that, on the one hand, DB defaults are more damaging to banks' balance sheets, and, on the other hand, they leave the sovereign with little margin to support the banking sector.
More insight into the damage to banks' balance sheets associated with DB defaults could be obtained from examining the evolution of claims on government as a share of GDP and assets (Figures 19 and 20) . Unfortunately, while the estimated coefficients plotted in these figures show substantial differences between D and DB, few of these differences are statistically significant, as standard errors are very large.
The most striking difference between the two events is that levels around DB episodes are much larger than either around D or "tranquil" times, suggesting that DB crises take place against banking sectors that are significantly more exposed to the government. Additionally, while banks significantly accumulate public debt in the run-up to both defaults, the pace is more accelerated ahead of DB than ahead of D.
Post-default, there is a gradual and significant decline in banks' holdings of public debt in both events.
Finally, regarding the public support to the banking system, the static indicators presented in Table 6 of the Appendix 1 show that the fiscal and recapitalization costs of banking crises occurring after sovereign defaults are strikingly small relative to the other two types of banking crises.
Our results thus suggest that, around the two events, there are large and systematic differences in the levels and dynamics of both the liquidity support provided by the central bank and banks' exposure to the sovereign. These differences could suggest that banking sectors come under more stress after DB defaults than after D ones, due to, among other things, their larger exposure to the sovereign and smaller government support.
The banking sector
Unfortunately, the estimates of banking sector indicators are imprecise and plagued by high standard errors. Figure 21 shows that bank assets expand ahead of both events, although the expansion is more accelerated ahead of DB. In the aftermath, assets decrease significantly in both events, but sharper in DB. The initial size of the banking sector is larger in D than in DB, but, due to the subsequent faster increase in DB, levels are similar entering the crisis and post-default.
Turning to the evolution of credit to the private sector (Figure 22 ), the roughly flat dynamics ahead of D contrast with the significant credit boom ahead of DB. Post default, credit contracts in both episodes, although the crunch is larger and more sustained in DB than in D. On average, the credit-to-GDP ratio is significantly larger around D episodes than around DB ones. In turn, there is a significant increase of deposits (as % of GDP) (Figure 23 ) ahead of DB, followed by a fast and substantial deposit run, indicating that banking sectors in these events are confronted with a larger loss in confidence. This contrasts with the flat dynamics around D crises -in particular, D is the only type of crisis that appears to not lead to a deposit run.
Thus, overall, the average banking sector around DB events appears to be smaller than the one ahead of D events, suggesting that the larger amounts of liquidity support provided by the central bank after defaults in DB may be due to the more damaging impact of the default on the banking sector in these crises, rather than to the size of the banking sector. The fact that DB defaults are also followed by large deposit runs confirms the more disruptive impact of the sovereign on the banking sector. In contrast, the impact of D defaults on the banking sector is more muted.
Public finances
Figures 24-26 depict the behavior of budget balances, together with the corresponding revenues and expenses. Budget deficits are larger ahead of D than ahead of DB (indeed, they are larger than in "tranquil" times). In both events, corrections of fiscal deficits start the year of the default, but the tightening is significantly more pronounced after the DB defaults. Underlying these dynamics is the markedly different behavior of budget expense (while levels and dynamics are rather similar on the revenue side). Public spending is flat and significantly larger than in "tranquil" times ahead of both defaults. However dynamics start to diverge significantly starting with the default: in D, public spending decreases gradually, such that, after two years, expense is lower than pre-crisis levels and similar to "tranquil" ones. In contrast, the default in DB is accompanied by a drop in public spending, which is especially sharp during T+1, and, post-crisis, public spending remains at levels significantly lower than "tranquil" ones. Thus, in the aftermath of the default, public expense is cut more drastically in DB than in D -in fact, during the years following the default, public spending is significantly larger in D than in DB.
This could be an indication of the lack of fiscal space in the aftermath of DB defaults, or the adoption of a more austere stabilization package, both of which may negatively affect the banking sector in the short run. Figure 27 shows that there is a significant and sustained increase in government debt ahead of both crises and, moreover, debt levels remain larger than pre-crisis ones in the aftermath of both defaults. While initial levels are similar, the ratio becomes significantly larger in the immediate aftermath of the DB default than in that of the D one. Starting with T+1 though, the reduction in debt is significantly faster in DB than in D, which could be another potential signal of a tighter austerity package implemented in the aftermath of DB defaults.
Domestic economy and the external sector
Figures 28 and 29 trace the dynamics of real growth and inflation rates around the two episodes. Growth falls rapidly ahead of D crises and recovers equally rapidly in the aftermath, while inflation stays mostly flat throughout the crisis window. In contrast, DB defaults have a larger immediate negative impact on growth, while the recovery is slower. These growth dynamics are accompanied by inflation rates that are slowly moderating, going from levels that are significantly above "tranquil" times at T-3 to levels that are significantly below at T+3 -a further indication of a possible tight austerity package implemented in the aftermath of defaults in DB crises.
As shown in Figure 30 , there is a gradual but constant decrease in portfolio capital inflows around D crises, from levels significantly above "tranquil" times down to levels similar to non-crisis ones, suggesting that investors start retrenching already several years before the default. In contrast, in DB events foreign capital keeps flowing in up until T-1, and the default is accompanied by a sharp drop in portfolio inflows (followed by a later rebound to pre-crisis levels). What is more striking in DB is that the levels of capital flows are significantly below "tranquil" times both before and after the default. Thus, there is limited foreign capital flowing into the economy around these events.
Turning to short-term external debt dynamics, Figure 31 shows that flat and similar levels ahead of the two defaults are followed by completely diverging dynamics in the aftermath. In particular, the composition of foreign borrowing dramatically changes towards short-term maturities in the wake of DB defaults and ahead of the ensuing banking crisis. The opposite takes place in the aftermath of D, where the share of short-term external debt decreases significantly after the default, to levels well below "tranquil" values. Together with the behavior of portfolio inflows, these dynamics point to a larger loss in credibility suffered by the sovereign in DB, which negatively impacts the banking sector and the economy.
Conclusions
In light of the recent turmoil in a number of advanced countries, understanding the channels through which distress transmits from the sovereign to financial institutions, and-vice-versa is of utmost importance. In this paper, we study past episodes of banking and sovereign distress in emerging economies, making the distinction between "single" episodes and those in which banking and sovereign debt crises combine ("twin" crises).
Our contribution is two-fold. Firstly, we find that there are systematic differences between "single" crises and "twin" ones, across several dimensions, including the balance sheet interconnection between the banking and public sectors, the characteristics of the banking sector, the state of public finances, and the macroeconomic environment. Secondly, we show that considering the sequence of crises within twin events, that is, taking into account whether the trigger of a twin episode is a debt crisis or a banking one, is important for understanding the potential drivers, transmission channels and economic consequences of these crises.
The stylized facts presented in this paper provide support to several recent theories according to which, in the presence of large banking systems, governments have more incentives to avoid defaults, as their effects on the economy would be amplified through the impact on banks' balance sheets (Gennaioli et al., 2014) . Our results also provide support to theories arguing that monetary and fiscal coordination, and the ensuing Central Bank balance sheet expansion, are an integral part of crisis resolution strategies (Corsetti and Dedola, 2013) . Last but not least, our findings show that, during the spread of sovereign crises to the banking sector, the shift from providing credit to the private sector to providing financing to the public sector is a well established regularity. This result provides support for modeling strategies along the lines of Broner et al. (2014) . Sources: Laeven and Valencia (2013a) , S&P and authors' calculations. "NPL" refers to non-performing loans. Change in number of banks refers to the change between T and T+3. Fiscal and recapitalization costs are measured as % of GDP. The table reports the coefficients obtained from a fixed-effects panel regression of the variable in the title on a seven-year window around crisis events, controlling for country fixed effects. Crisis events are spilt into independent debt crises; independent bank crises; twin debt-bank crises; and twin bank-debt crises. The variable is first normalized by dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. The sample period is 1975 to 2007. Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively The table reports the coefficients obtained from a fixed-effects panel regression of the variable in the title on a seven-year window around crisis events, controlling for country fixed effects. Crisis events are spilt into independent debt crises; independent bank crises; twin debt-bank crises; and twin bank-debt crises. The variable is first normalized by dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. The sample period is 1975 to 2007. Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively The table reports the coefficients obtained from a fixed-effects panel regression of the variable in the title on a seven-year window around crisis events, controlling for country fixed effects. Crisis events are spilt into independent debt crises; independent bank crises; twin debt-bank crises; and twin bank-debt crises. The variable is first normalized by dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. The sample period is 1975 to 2007. Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively The table reports the coefficients obtained from a fixed-effects panel regression of the variable in the title on a seven-year window around crisis events, controlling for country fixed effects. Crisis events are spilt into independent debt crises; independent bank crises; twin debt-bank crises; and twin bank-debt crises. The variable is first normalized by dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. The sample period is 1975 to 2007. Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively The table reports the coefficients obtained from a fixed-effects panel regression of the variable in the title on a seven-year window around crisis events, controlling for country fixed effects. Crisis events are spilt into independent debt crises; independent bank crises; twin debt-bank crises; and twin bank-debt crises. The variable is first normalized by dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. The sample period is 1975 to 2007. Standard errors, clustered at the country-level, are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
